Human Factors, Ethics, and Morality Newest Post evacuarlos 11:37 AM

The utilization of an Unmanned Air System (UAS) for warfare carries similar ethical considerations as one for a manned aircraft for scenarios where an operator is in the decision making loop.  Warfare brings difficult questions and situations that till strain even the most experienced war fighter.  There are distinct differences between what is legal and what is ethical during war.  Modern nations enforce codes of conduct and laws for military personnel.  In the U.S. there is the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which applies to all military members worldwide (USAF, 2016).  The UCMJ was designed to “promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United States” (USMC, 2016).

Combat operations require additional guidelines in terms of rules of engagement.  These are outlined by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Instruction 3121.01B.  The Instruction provides for self-defense guidelines as well as the definition of the use of force to accomplish a mission against hostile forces (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016).  This is where ethical and moral considerations come in to place when using UAS for national defense.  A manned aircraft pilot is deployed to a theater of operations with an intended purpose; there are Intelligence, Search, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions that can turn into attack opportunities.  UAS can be deployed for long duration ISR missions and identify threats with their payload.

The identification of a threat and its ultimate elimination becomes controversial when automation is included in the decision making process.  “It is not quite clear whether robotic/autonomous weapons can be considered just as an evolution of smart weapons and another progress toward making warfare more ethical – a view taken by Ronald Arkin (Arkin 2008), or whether they would amount to the exact opposite: simply a new means of making war more destructive and brutal and thus representing a very negative tendency” (Krishnan, 2009).  The decision to utilize force is affected by the removal of the pilot from the aircraft, essentially out of harm’s way.  While this is an inherent benefit to the pilot, it can result in an erosion of the barriers to kill: “fear of being killed and resistance to killing” (Lin, Abney, & Bekey, 2011).

Training for UAS operators must be different than the one for pilots of manned aircraft to ensure decision making is not affected by geographic separation from combat.  The fact that UAS operators are exposed to their regular live stressors can add to their level of stress.  This is a human factor that is unique in the sense that an operator can be at home and spend time with their families, only to report to work and perform interdiction missions that will lead to killing.  Research has proven that untrained personnel making a decision that involves harming others causes moral dilemmas, emotional conflicts, which requires a higher level of behavioral control (Majdandzic, et al., 2012).

A high degree of automation can inject a significant human factor for UAS operations.  The US does not permit the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) to kill a person without human intervention.  This is not the same in other countries; both South Korea and Israel have deployed targeting turrets for border protection that have the capability to identify and eliminate a person in the case of unauthorized access (Parkin, 2015).  Utilizing AI to kill people does not eliminate human factors, it simply moves them up during the development phase.  This is an inherent flaw with all intelligent systems: they were designed by humans.

References

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2016). Chapter 5: Rules of Engagement. Retrieved from Loc.gov: http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/OLH_2015_Ch5.pdf

Krishnan, A. (2009). Killer Robots Legality and Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons. El Paso: Ashgate Publishing.

Lin, P., Abney, K., & Bekey, G. A. (2011). Robot Ethics: The Ethicl and Social Implications of Robotics. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

Majdandzic, J., Bauer, H., Windischberger, C., Moser, E., Engl, E., & Lamm, C. (2012). The Human Factor: Behavioral and Neural Correlates of Humanized Perception in Moral Decision Making. Vienna: PLOS.

Parkin, S. (2015, July 16). Killer Robots: The soldiers that never sleep. Retrieved from BBC.com: http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150715-killer-robots-the-soldiers-that-never-sleep

USAF. (2016). Uniformed Code of Military Justice. Retrieved from AU.AF.MIL: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ucmj.htm

USMC. (2016). Military Justice Fact Sheets. Retrieved from Hqmc.marines.mil: http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/135/MJFACTSHTS%5B1%5D.html 

Operational Risk Management evacuarlos 11:36 AM

The Small Unmanned Air System (SUAS) selected for analysis is the Mavrik X8 quad rotor SUAS developed by SteadiDrone.  This particular SUAS was designed around its front mounted gimbal to provide unobstructed imagery.  The designers are targeting the aerial imaging industry and have developed a SUAS that is capable and economical.  One of the advantages of this particular SUAS is its ability to fold away for transport in a lightweight case.  Operation of this SUAS for commercial applications require the development of an Operational Risk Management (ORM) program.  The purpose of the ORM is to identify hazards that are associated with operation of the SUAS.  Assessments are performed to identify the level of risk and determine if the mission falls within acceptable and established safety limits.  The Department of Defense (DoD) established a standard practice for the evaluation of risks.  MIL-STD-882 is utilized to identify the “DoD approach for identifying hazards and assessing and mitigating associated risks encountered in the development, test, production, use, and disposal of defense system” (Department of Defense, 2012).

The first step in the creation of an ORM is the development of Preliminary Hazard Lists (PHL).  Physical characteristics of the SUAS must be evaluated and thoroughly understood in order to develop the required PHL.  Figure 1 illustrates the dimensions and operations specifications of the SUAS.  The different PHL capture the identified hazards during each stage of the operation; in this case the stages are: planning, staging, launch, flight, and recovery.  Each evaluation was performed through analysis and discussion of the associated dangers with operation of the SUAS during a commercial building survey.  The PHLs covered man, machine, method, and environment.  Figures 2 through 6 cover the PHL for each of the stages of operation of the Mavrik X8 SUAS.

Figure 1. Dimensions and operation specifications of Mavrik X8 SUAS.  Retrieved from https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1zbGeuC_WU5cX V4Y0VPVzM0YkE /view?pref=2&pli=1

Preliminary Hazard List (PHL)

Figure 2. Planning PHL.

Figure 3. Staging PHL.

Figure 4. Launch PHL.

Figure 5. Flight PHL.

Figure 6. Recovery PHL.

Operational Hazard Review and Analysis

            The purpose of the Operational Hazard Review and Analysis (OHR&A) is to further identify and evaluate the hazards associated with the SUAS operation.  It takes the analysis from the PHL and further looks at the mitigating actions identified to address risk.  Each of these actions is further evaluated to determine if they were adequate or if further actions are needed to reduce/eliminate risk.  Figures 7 though 11 cover the OHR&A for each stage of the operation of the Mavrik X8 SUAS.

Figure 7. Planning OHR&A

Figure 8. Staging OHR&A

Figure 9. Launch OHR&A

Figure 10. Flight OHR&A

Figure 11. Recovery OHR&A

Operational Risk Management (ORM) Tool

The ORM tool is the culmination of risk analysis for a particular operation.  Its purpose is to provide an easy to use and understand method to evaluate the level of risk with a particular operation.  The tool is divided in the different type of missions for the SUAS including training, check flights, revenue flights, and experimental flights.  Each type of flight carries a different level of risk, which is evaluated in each respective category of operaitons including planning, staging, launch, flight, and recovery.  The ORM for the Mavrik X8 is illustrated in Figure 12.

Figure 12. ORM tool for Mavrik X8.

References

Barnhart, R. K. (2012). Introduction to unmanned aircraft systems. Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis.

Department of Defense. (2012, May 11). MIL-STD-882E. Retrieved from system-safety.org: http://www.system-safety.org/Documents/MIL-STD-882E.pdf

SteadiDrone. (2016). Mavrik X8 Overview. Retrieved from drive.google.com: https://drive. google.com/file/d/0B1zbGeuC_WU5cXV4Y0VPVzM0YkE/view?pref=2&pli=1

Automatic Takeoff and Landing evacuarlos 11:24 AM

Takeoff and landing are the most critical phases of flight.  A study conducted by Boeing revealed that 13% of all aircraft accidents happen during takeoff and 48% happen during landing (Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 2015).  These are significant figures that shed light into the complexity of the operations, especially landing.  Pilots are challenged to ensure landings are safe in all conditions, whether day or night; the FAA clearly delineates that the majority of the landing accidents are due to a failure in the decision making process of the pilots (Federal Aviation Administration, 2008).  This is where technology, such as Autoland, was developed to address the human factors and improve operational safety.

            When Boeing introduced the 787 Dreamliner, it was announced as the most technologically advanced commercial passenger aircraft (Bender, 2013).  It has even been described by pilots as “17 computer servers packaged in a Kevlar frame” (Leff, 2012).  The aircraft is equipped with a modern array of avionics systems and components.  The Honeywell powered flight control systems provide for automatic takeoff and landings (Weisberger, 2012).   The aircraft utilizes data from the Instrument Landing System (ILS) and GPS to ensure safety; pilots routinely use components of the automatic takeoff and landing systems to augment manual operations.  “That being said, we do use "pieces" of the autoflight system during takeoff. The auto-thrust system is normally used to fine tune power after the pilot initiates takeoff, the auto-brake system is set to RTO to react with brakes if the pilot closes the thrust levers to Reject the TakeOff. Some pilots engage the autopilot above a few hundred feet above ground, especially in busy terminal areas, so that the pilots can manage the overall flight while they let the autopilot deal with the details” (Inch, 2014).

            The level of training provided to pilots who transition to the 787 varies of their previous experience.  A pilot with 777 flight experience can be 787 certified in as little as 5 days, while one with non-Boeing experience must undergo 20 days of training (Nader, Al, Haber, & Reiter, 2008).  The training covers all areas of flight, including Autoland.  Maintenance mechanics and engineers are also trained in the use of the Maintenance Performance Toolbox system, which includes all aspects of avionics and systems (Boeing, 2012).  The level of training is a testament of the complexity of the aircraft.  A recommendation to improve the automated takeoff and landing capabilities would be to utilize the already integrated Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS), which will provide a lower cost and higher precision than ILS.  The implementation of this approach is currently pending approval by the FAA, but it is expected to take place in 2018 (Croft, 2015).

            An unmanned system that performs automated takeoff and landing is the Falcon 9 rocket developed by SpaceX.  The goal of the company is to design and deploy a reusable rocket system to reduce the overall cost of cargo movement to space (Space Exploration Technologies Corp, 2015).  The rocket utilizes a complex set of maneuvers for launch and landing; after ascent and stage separation, the rocket performs a maneuver and burn, followed by aerodynamic guidance by grid fins to perform a vertical landing (Space Exploration Technologies Corp, 2015).  An important component of the landing feature are the grid fins.  “A key upgrade to enable precision targeting of the Falcon 9 all the way to touchdown is the addition of four hypersonic grid fins placed in an X-wing configuration around the vehicle, stowed on ascent and deployed on reentry to control the stage’s lift vector. Each fin moves independently for roll, pitch and yaw, and combined with the engine gimbaling, will allow for precision landing – first on the autonomous spaceport drone ship, and eventually on land” (Space Exploration Technologies Corp, 2014).

Touchdown is performed by carbon fiber landing legs that are automatically deployed before touchdown. 

            The autonomous systems that provide for takeoff and landing have been further refined since their introduction.  The company attempted a first landing on a barge that ultimately failed due to a failure in one of the landing legs not fully deploying.  “"Falcon lands on droneship, but the lockout collet doesn't latch on one [of] the four legs, causing it to tip over post-landing," Musk says. "[The] root cause may have been ice buildup due to condensation from heavy fog at liftoff” (Grush, 2016).  This is an automated system that relies on computational power for its successful operation.  The complex nature of this system does not provide for a manual operation, and it is not designed to be part of the system

            Modern aircraft, such as the 787, possess the necessary technology and equipment to perform successful takeoffs and landing.  In the case of these aircraft it is the regulations that prevent full system deployment in the interest of safety.  The FAA performs evaluations of newer technology and ensures there is complete readiness before allowing automated operations.  This is not the case for the Falcon 9 rocket; it is designed to be unmanned and with a high level of autonomy.  Automated landing and takeoff are integral parts of the business approach from SpaceX, and their research investments are paying off.  The limitations of the rocket are, for the most part, not regulatory but technology related.  The future of transportation seems to move into the direction of more autonomy, which will have the effect of reducing costs and increasing safety.

References

Bender, A. (2013, January16). Airlines Ground 787 Dreamliner: Should Passengers Be Worried? Retrieved from Forbes.com: http://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewbender /2013/01/16/airlines-ground-787-dreamliner-should-passengers-be-worried/#74ebeb04387f

Boeing. (2012). Maintenance Performance Toolbox. Retrieved from Boeing.com: http://www.boeing.com/resources/boeingdotcom/commercial/services/assets/brochure/maintenanceperformancetoolbox.pdf

Boeing Commercial Airplanes. (2015). Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents. Retrieved from http://www.boeing.com/resources/boeingdotcom/ company/about_bca/pdf/statsum.pdf

Croft, J. (2015, April 27). FAA Targets 2018 For GPS-Based Autoland Capability. Retrieved from Aviation Week Network: http://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/faa-targets-2018-gps-based-autoland-capability

Federal Aviation Administration. (2008). On Landings III. Retrieved from FAASafety.gov: https://www.faasafety.gov/files/gslac/library/documents/2011/Aug/56411/FAA%20P-8740-50%20OnLandingsPart%20III%20[hi-res]%20branded.pdf

Grush, L. (2016, January 17). SpaceX fails a third time to land its Falcon 9 on a drone ship in the sea. Retrieved from TheVerge.com: http://www.theverge.com/2016/1/17/ 10782708/spacex-launch-rocket-landing-failure-falcon-9

Inch, D. (2014, September 9). Why can't planes take off and/or land using the auto-pilot feature? Retrieved from Quora.com: https://www.quora.com/Why-cant-planes-take-off-and-or-land-using-the-auto-pilot-feature

Leff, g. (2012, April 21). The Boeing 787, for a Pilot's Perspective. Retrieved from WiewfromtheWing.com: http://viewfromthewing.boardingarea.com/2012/04/21/the-boeing-787-from-a-pilots-perspective/

Nader, Al, Haber, J., & Reiter, D. (2008). 787 Training for pilots and mechanics. Retrieved from Boeing.com: http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/articles/qtr_1_08 /AERO_Q108_article2.pdf

Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (2014, December 16). X MARKS THE SPOT: FALCON 9 ATTEMPTS OCEAN PLATFORM LANDING. Retrieved from Spacex.com: http://www.spacex.com/news/2014/12/16/x-marks-spot-falcon-9-attempts-ocean-platform-landing

Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (2015, June 25). The Why and How of Landing Rockets. Retrieved from http://www.spacex.com/news/2015/06/24/why-and-how-landing-rockets

Weisberger, H. (2012, July 11). Honeywell Takes Systems Integration To A New Level On 787. Retrieved from AINOnline.com: http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/farnborough-air-show/2012-07-11/honeywell-takes-systems-integration-new-level-787